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Abstract 
This contribution addresses the substantial tax subsidies for businesses introduced 
by the German Inheritance Tax Act 2009. Advocates in favour of the vast or even 
entire tax exemption for businesses stress the potential damage of the inheritance 
tax on businesses, as those often lack liquid assets to meet tax liability. This 
submission tackles this issue empirically based on data of the German Inheritance 
Tax Statistics and the SOEP. The results indicate that former German inheritance 
tax law has not endangered transferred businesses. Hence, there is no need for the 
tremendous tax privilege for businesses in current German inheritance tax law. A 
virtual uniformed inheritance tax without tax privileges, which meets revenue 
neutrality per tax class according to current tax law, provokes in some cases 
relative high tax loads which might trouble businesses. 
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Inheritance tax-exempt transfer of German businesses: 
Imperative or unjustified subsidy? – An empirical analyses 
 
1  Introduction 
The German Inheritance Tax Reform Act 2009 has been provoked by the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Constitutional Court. The court found fault with the erratic results of the valuation 
procedures for businesses and real estate in previous German inheritance taxation and the 
resulting unequal taxation.
1 However, a privileged taxation of distinct asset categories is 
according to the Federal Constitutional Court acceptable if this is in general public interest. 
But a preferential treatment must not take place in tax valuation procedures. Therefore all 
asset categories are supposed to be assessed by market values by new designed valuation 
procedures. 
Nucleus of the new German inheritance tax is a vast or even an entire tax exemption for 
transferred businesses which is justified by job protection. In addition, the German 
government stresses the importance of small-scale companies for economic growth and 
employment in Germany. The rationale for a preferred taxation of businesses is possible 
liquidity problems caused by the inheritance tax. These complaints about the negative effects 
on passing businesses onto children or other relatives due to restraints in entrepreneurial 
liquidity are not a specific German feature. This issue provokes controversial discussions in 
other countries, e.g. the USA, although, similar to Germany, contribution of inheritance tax to 
internal revenue is finite.
2 Not surprisingly, especially owner of family businesses indicate 
that the inheritance tax would make survival of their business more difficult if not 
impossible.
3 
Objective of this contribution is to figure out if the tax privilege in favour of businesses in 
current German inheritance tax law can be justified. As neither a negative effect nor the 
irrelevance of the inheritance tax on the passing of businesses to heirs or donees can be 
proofed theoretically, we approach this topic empirically. For that purpose we quantify the 
inheritance tax burden of transferred businesses empirically by exploiting data of the latest 
inheritance tax statistics of the Federal Statistical Office Germany. We calculate both the tax 
burden in case of former German inheritance tax law and the tax burden in case of a virtual 
inheritance tax without any tax privileges and lower tax rates. Simultaneously we examine the 
environment in which transfer of businesses takes place. In this context we assess to what 
extent transferees of (family) businesses are able to cover their inheritance tax liability by any 
but business assets. At least, this enables us to make a rough estimate if the inheritance tax 
                                                 
1  See BVerfG v. 7.11.2006, 1 BvL 10/02: recital 136. 
2   In Germany the inheritance tax contributes in 2007 only 0.8% to entire tax revenue (see Sachverständigenrat 
(2008/2009): recital 369). Sureth et. al. (2008): 187 f., provide a survey of absolute and relative inheritance 
tax revenues for several countries. 
3   See for example Holtz-Eakin/Phillips/Rosen (2001): 52. In a survey of 2,500 family businesses by Travis 
Research Association (1995) most of family business owners agreed with this view (see Travis Research 
Associates (1995): 3).   4
causes really the stated negative effects on family businesses and, subsequently, if a tax 
privilege in favour of businesses can be justified. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a review of the literature 
with particular respect to previous empirical findings. Section 3 highlights the former and 
current taxation of transferred businesses in German inheritance tax law. In Section 4 we 
discuss pros and cons of a tax privilege in favour of businesses, in Section 5 we present our 
empirical findings and in Section 6 we result in the conclusion. 
2  Literature survey 
The appraisal of tax privileges in favour of business property provided by the German 
Inheritance Tax Act 2009 in literature is ambiguous. Some authors support basically a tax 
exemption for businesses following the argument of the German Government that paying 
inheritance tax could endanger enterprises and with them jobs (Alt/Barbaro (2007); Lang 
(2008)). Other authors disagree about the tax privilege in favour of businesses by stressing in 
particular fairness aspects, the possibility of employing capital markets and the feasibility of a 
tax deferral provision (Hey (2007); Maiterth/Niemann et. al. (2006); Sachverständigenrat 
(2005/2006) and (2008/2009); Seer (2009); Viskorf (2008)). Unfortunately all contributions 
rely solely on theoretical considerations without an empirical basis. Hence, the results depend 
to a large extent on assumptions concerning the efficiency of capital markets. 
However, international literature provides some empirical results with regard to liquidity 
problems bequeathed businesses can face to meet the inheritance tax liability. 
Harriss (1949) tackles problems such as timing or matching problems, which may occur, 
when assets of a business have to be sold to meet the US estate tax liability
4. The findings 
based on data from Statistics of Income for estates filed in 1942-1944 show for the great mass 
of taxable estates no difficulties in transforming assets into cash to pay the estate tax. But, for 
a small number of extremely valuable estates (these cover 47% of total tax revenue) liquid 
assets fail to balance the estate tax liability.  
Astrachan/Tutterow (1996) deal with the question whether and how the US estate tax affects 
business behaviour by a telephone poll of 1,003 businesses where nearly 80% were family 
businesses. The results of the survey suggest that estate taxes cause business owners to alter 
the management of their enterprises in ways that depress economic activity. The entrepreneurs 
stated to invest less and create fewer jobs than they would if they did not face the prospect of 
estate taxes. With regard to a transfer of their business, 66% of the respondents claim threats 
to business survival and 8% presume the death of their business. 
Holtz-Eakin (1999) analyses behavioural response to the estate tax. Based on data collected in 
a mail survey sent to businesses in upstate NY his econometrical results show a considerable 
negative relationship between the number of jobs created in the past five years and future 
estate tax liability. Holtz-Eakin concludes “that the estate tax is shifted-forward in time to the 
business operation and onto the production factors capital and labour”. 
                                                 
4   In the United States there is an estate tax instead of an inheritance tax.   5
Holtz-Eakin/Phillips/Rosen (2001) examine whether and how people use life insurance to 
hedge US estate tax and avoid liquidity problems. Their findings rely on a pooled database of 
two nationally representative samples of older persons for a specific year (HRS and AHEAD). 
There findings suggest that owners of businesses buy more insurance than other individuals 
do, but, even together with other liquid assets, they can not balance estate tax liability.  
Brunetti (2006) estimates if, and to what extent, the US estate tax forces sales of family 
business and farm. His econometric analysis is based on the probate records of the San 
Francisco County Superior Court from 1980 to 1982, which include 312 estates that contain 
business or farm. The results of the paper show a positive and significant relationship between 
the estate tax and business sales.  
Unfortunately the results of these empirical papers do not provide a satisfactory answer to the 
question if the German inheritance tax endangers the transfer of businesses. Harriss (1949), 
Holtz-Eakin (1999) and Holtz-Eakin/Phillips/Rosen (2001) do not draw any conclusions if 
estate taxes endanger family businesses. Although the findings of Astrachan/Tutterow (1996) 
and Brunetti (2006) suggest a distinct negative impact of the US estate tax on the transfer of 
businesses the results can not be applied straight to Germany. The main reason is the 
remarkably higher tax load of businesses by the US estate tax compared to the German 
inheritance tax as a result of remarkably higher US tax rates.
 5 In addition the conclusions of 
Astrachan/Tutterow (1996) are based on a survey of entrepreneurs, which presumably might 
provide distorted results as almost every survey offers complains about taxation by the 
respondents. Also the findings of Brunetti (2006) are not entirely convincing as he found out 
the liquidity effect, regularly made responsible for the negative effect of estate respectively 
inheritance taxes, is statistically not significant. That means the results do not support a 
liquidity link to business sales.
6 In addition it has to be taken into account that the sample is 
very small. It contains only 312 estates that include businesses in a time period of 4 years 
from which only a small fraction was sold (e.g in 1982 there were only 14.7% of 116 = 17 
businesses sold). 
3  Transfer of businesses in former and current German inheritance tax law 
3.1  A brief German inheritance tax act-overview 
The German Inheritance Tax Act (Erbschaft- und Schenkungsteuergesetz, ErbStG) applies to 
transfers of property and with it transfers of businesses regardless if transfers result from 
heritage or donation. Subject to tax is the enrichment of the beneficiary (and not the estate of 
the bequeather as in an estate tax) valued according to the Valuation Tax Act 
(Bewertungsgesetz, BewG). Former donations within the last ten years are added and tax 
exemptions (e.g. for businesses according to Sec. 13a ErbStG) are stripped just as personal 
allowances. The resulting so called “taxable enrichment” is subject to a progressive tax scale. 
Both personal allowances and tax rates differ according to consanguinity. Tax class I 
comprises spouses, children and grandchildren
7, tax class II contains other close relatives and 
                                                 
5   The presented literature takes marginal US estate tax rates up to 55% into account. 
6   Brunetti (2006): 1989, states in this context: “it is difficult to understand why the estate tax effect is large 
while the liquidity effect is not”.  
7  In case of heritage parents and grandparents are included, as well.   6
tax class III applies in particular to unrelated individuals.
8 The tax scale is direct progressive 
and it is a graduated tariff.
9 This means according to the taxable enrichment there is one 
particular tax rate. In case of transferred businesses Sec. 19a ErbStG provides the application 
of the (beneficial) tax rate according to tax class I.  
Table 1 depicts personal allowances according to former and current inheritance tax law. 
Table 1: Personal allowances according to inheritance tax status 2008 and 2009 
Tax class  Consanguinity 
Former tax law 
(Sec. 16 ErbStG 
2008) in Euro 
Current tax law 
(Sec. 16 ErbStG 
2009) in Euro 
I 
spouses 307,000  500,000 
children 205,000  400,000 
grandchildren 51,200  200,000 
others 51,200  100,000 
II all  10,300  20,000 
III all  5,200  20,000 
 
Table 2 illustrates nominal tax rates according to former and current inheritance tax law. 
Table 2: Inheritance tax scale according to inheritance tax status 2008 and 2009 
Taxable enrichment in Euro  
up to 
Tax rates in % 
Tax class I  Tax class II  Tax class III 
2008  2009  2008 & 2009  2008  2009  2008  2009 




256,00 300,000  11  17  23 
512,000 600,000  15  22  29 
5,113,000 6,000,000  19  27  35 
12,783,000 13,000,000  23  32 
50 
41 
50  25,565,000 26,000,000  17  37  47 
Beyond 30  40  50 
 
The notable increase of tax rates in tax class II and III has no impact on businesses because 
businesses are always subject to tax class I as long as the transfer is not tax-free at all. 
                                                 
8  For details refer to Sec. 15 ErbStG. 
9   Sec. 19 Para. 3 ErbStG secures marginal tax rates lower than 75 %.   7
3.2  Taxation of businesses according to former German inheritance tax law 
The former German inheritance tax law granted businesses
10 three subsidies. On the one hand, 
the average tax value of businesses fell below market value.
11 Tax values of sole 
proprietorships and partnerships amounted on average about 50% of market values whereas 
shares in non-listed corporations were ordinary rated with 70% of their market value (Sureth 
et. al. (2008): 193-195).
12 On the other hand former inheritance tax law provided two explicit 
tax subsidies for businesses (Sec. 13a and 19a ErbStG 2008). Sec. 13a ErbStG 2008 provided 
a tax allowance of 225,000 Euro for every business as well as assessing the remainder only 
with 65%. If a business was transferred to an individual who belongs to tax class II or III, 
88% of the business was taxed according to the (lower) rate of tax class I (Sec. 19a ErbStG 
2008). The last two subsidies required the business not being sold within five years after its 
transfer. 
3.3  Vast or entire tax exemption for businesses in current German inheritance tax law 
The vast or entire tax exemption of businesses (Sec. 13a and 13b ErbStG 2009) is the crucial 
and most controversial discussed point of German Inheritance Tax Reform Act 2009.
13 
The vast tax exemption of businesses forms the rule and releases businesses to 85% from 
taxation (Sec. 13b Para. 4 ErbStG) and is guaranteed officially.
14 In addition Sec. 13a Para. 2 
ErbStG provides a tax allowance of 150,000 Euro for the remaining 15%.
15 
The 85%-tax exemption is granted only if the following requirements are fulfilled: 
  Non-productive assets in terms of Sec. 13b Para. 2 ErbStG must not account for more than 
50% of all assets. Otherwise 100% of business assets are subject to inheritance tax. 
  Within seven years after the transfer of a business aggregate wages must not fall below 
650% of average wages paid per year before transferring the business (so called job-clause 
of Sec. 13a Para. 1 ErbStG). If aggregate wages fall below the threshold of 650% the 85%-
tax exemption is reduced according to the shortfall of aggregate wages.
16 
  A sale of the business within seven years after its transfer leads to a reduction of the 85%-
tax exemption on a pro-rata basis (so called sales-clause of Sec. 13a Para. 5 ErbStG). If 
                                                 
10  Tax privileged businesses incorporate sole proprietorships and partnerships in any sector (agriculture and 
forestry, commercial and industrial as well as freelance business). In addition qualified shareholding in 
corporations (quota greater than 25%) is also tax privileged. 
11  See for a discussion of former tax valuation procedures with regard to economic valuation procedures e.g. 
Hartmann (1962); Bolsenkötter (1969); Groh (1970); Linke (1981); Moxter (1976); Hübner (1993). 
12   For the valuation of corporations for tax purposes in detail refer to Müller (2008). 
13   This contribution does not present all of the recent amendments in German inheritance tax law. For a 
detailled survey see Fahrenschon (2008); Fechner (2008); Herbach/Kühnold (2008); Lüdicke/Fürwentsches 
(2009); Oertzen (2008); Wiegand (2008); Wiese/Lukas (2009).  
14  For a detailed description of the current inheritance tax rules with respect to transfer of businesses see e.g. 
Balmes/Felten (2009). 
15  The tax allowance of 150,000 Euro is reduced if the remaining 15% exceeds 150,000 Euro. The reduction 
amounts to 50% of the exceeding value. This means that businesses up to a value of 1 Mio. Euro can be 
transferred entirely tax-free. 
16   In contrast, the tax allowance according to Sec. 13a Para. 2 ErbStG is unaffected.   8
sales revenues are reinvested the tax privilege keeps unaffected. Excessive withdrawals 
cause a reduction of the 85% tax exemption in either case.
17 
The non-tax exempt fraction of business assets benefits from the tax privilege of Sec. 19a 
ErbStG and is taxed according to tax class I irrespective of consanguinity. 
Alternatively to the 85%-tax exemption an entire tax-free transfer of a business can be 
claimed (Sec. 13a Para. 8 ErbStG) if the following restrictive requirements are fulfilled: 
  Non-productive assets in terms of Sec. 13b Para. 2 ErbStG must not add up to more than 
10% of all assets. 
  The aggregate wage rule holds for ten years. Within this period 1000% of the average 
wages per year before transferring the business must be paid. 
  The retention period is ten instead of seven years. 
According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court the new valuation 
procedures for businesses (Sec. 199-203 BewG) are supposed to result in market values. 
Businesses have to be assessed even in case of claiming for an entire tax-free transfer of 
businesses according to Sec. 13a Para. 8 ErbStG. 
4  Pros and cons for an inheritance tax privilege in favour of businesses 
The most popular argument in favour of an inheritance tax privilege for businesses is the 
potential negative effect on family businesses and in the end on jobs (see e.g. 
Astrachen/Tutterow (1996); Brunetti (2006); Harris (1949); Holtz-Eakin/Phillips/Rosen 
(2001)). This is also stated by the German Government to justify the introduction of the 
comprehensive tax subsidy for businesses. Inheritance tax can jeopardise businesses due to 
liquidity problems if the transferees of a business lack liquid assets to meet inheritance tax 
liability and if, in addition, imperfect capital markets inhibit refunding. Furthermore, 
advocates of an inheritance tax privilege in favour of businesses stress the specialised leading 
skills of relatives resulting from their particular identification and family specific know-how 
(Bennedsen et. al. (2007)). In addition it is stated that principal agent problems are less 
virulent. This leads to the conclusion businesses should remain within the family for welfare 
reasons and therefore a tax privilege is justified. 
But, there are several arguments that challenge this perception. To keep the management 
inside of a family reduces the pool of capable managers considerable without need 
(Maiterth/Niemann et. al. (2006); Sachverständigenrat (2008/2009)). Furthermore, empirical 
findings to the performance of businesses run by families or heirs for Denmark, France, 
Germany, the USA und the UK militate against a tax privilege. Bloom/van Reenen (2006) 
found out that mismanagement in particular occurs if a business is transferred to the eldest son 
(primogeniture), whereas the management abilities are not affected if the entire family 
appoints the management of a transferred business. In contrast Morck/Shleifer/Vishny (1988), 
Bennedsen et. al. (2007), Pérez-González (2006) and Villalonga/Amit (2006) detected in 
general a significantly poorer performance of companies run by heirs compared to firms with 
                                                 
17   The tax allowance according to Sec. 13a Para. 2 ErbStG remains again unaffected.   9
non-family executives. Grossmann/Strulik (2008) disapprove an inheritance tax privilege for 
businesses in a general equilibrium model. In their findings lower management skills 
dominate transaction cost savings. But, if the Government decides to introduce a tax privilege, 
there should be no link to the business being continued by the heirs. 
A further argument against an inheritance tax privilege in favour of businesses is provided by 
the resulting considerable compliance costs of such a regulation. As a glance at Sec. 13a and 
13b ErbStG reveals there are considerable enforcement costs in form of declaration costs for 
taxpayer as well as control costs for tax authorities.
18 A tax privilege for particular asset 
categories requires a clear distinction of privileged and unprivileged assets. As a definite 
classification of asset categories can not be delivered, taxpayers face enormous incentives and 
as a result high tax planning costs to re-qualify unprivileged into privileged assets. This in 
turn causes (costly) defence action by the tax authorities. These considerable compliance costs 
would not emerge from an inheritance tax with a broad tax base and thus without a 
differential treatment of asset categories. 
Another notable aspect regards measures taken by entrepreneurs to minimize the impact of 
inheritance tax on the transfer of their business.
19 As empirical findings indicate, 
entrepreneurs take – dead weight costs generating – measures to minimise the impact of the 
inheritance tax on the transfer of their business.
20 This might be the reason for the lack of 
empirical evidence that the former German inheritance tax caused liquidation or sales of 
firms. Interestingly this view has been confirmed by the German minister of finance Peer 
Steinbrück
21, who was in charge when the German Inheritance Tax Reform Act 2009 took 
place. 
A further relevant point against a tax privilege for businesses in form of a tax exemption is the 
lack of accuracy of this measure. Even if public welfare or other reasons required businesses 
to stay within a family
22 a general tax exemption would not be the appropriate measure to 
assure this. Liquidity problems which, as mentioned above, could result from capital markets 
imperfections would be mitigated properly by a tax deferral regulation.
23 However, a general 
tax exemption can by no means be justified. Furthermore, with respect to tax induced liquidity 
                                                 
18  See for the categorisation of compliance costs in declaration costs and enforcement costs and furthermore 
declaration costs and control cost as part of the enforcement costs Wagner (2005): 94. The considerable 
enforcement costs of the inheritance tax privilege in favour of businesses are already revealed by throwing a 
glance at Sec. 13a and 13b ErbStG. 
19  In a survey of Travis Research Associates (1995): 3, four out of five respondents stated that they have 
already taken steps to mitigate liquidity problems, e.g. by the purchase of life insurance. But if the heirs were 
to inherit the business they would lack liquidity to balance tax liability. 
20  See Astrachan/Tutterow (1996); Holtz-Eatkin (1999); Holtz-Eatkin/Phillips/Rosen (2001). In a survey of 
Travis Research Associates (1995): 3, four out of five respondents stated that they have already taken steps to 
mitigate liquidity problems, e.g. by the purchase of life insurance. But if the heirs were to inherit the business 
they would lack liquidity to balance tax liability.  
21  This happened during a speach in the German Parliament on the Inheritance Tax Reform Act 2009 on 
27.11.2008. 
22   According to Hey (2007): 573, it is – irrespective of public welfare aspects – a legitimate objective to support 
the “culture of family businesses”. 
23  See Maiterth/Niemann et. al. (2006); Bach/Broekelschen/Maiterth (2006): 1967; Hey (2007): 573; Sach-
verständigenrat (2008/2009): recital 366; Seer (2009): 236; Viskorf (2008): 21.   10
problems it has to be kept in mind that an inheritance tax law with no exemptions enables 
remarkable lower tax rates, as will be shown later on. This in turn could mitigate liquidity 
problems to a large extent if not eliminate them.  
Last but not least the perception of a particular tax as fair or unfair plays a crucial role for its 
acceptance. If a tax is regarded as fair people will be less reluctant to pay as if they regard the 
tax as unfair.
24 As the current German inheritance tax burden of an individual depends 
crucially on the asset category of the bequest it might presumably be regarded as unfair. But it 
remains unclear to what extent the job protection argument countervails this perception. 
Summing up the arguments neither a negative effect of the inheritance tax on family 
businesses nor its innocuousness can be proven theoretically. In the end it is an empirical 
question if or, respectively, to what extent the German inheritance tax causes liquidity 
problems for businesses. For this reason we quantify the inheritance tax burden of each 
transferred businesses empirically within the framework of the micro simulation model 
ErbSiHM based on the data of the latest inheritance tax statistics of the Federal Statistical 
Office Germany. Unfortunately the data merely contain information about the inheritance tax 
status of the transferee of a business but lack information, what happens to the business after 
being transferred. Hence, we can not prove in an econometric model if or, respectively, to 
what extent the German inheritance tax forces business sales. But we can tackle the problem 
by gaining deeper insights in (possible) liquidity problems caused by the inheritance tax, 
which allows some sound predictions, if tax privileges for businesses can be justified. 
5  Micro simulation model ErbSiHM 
5.1  Model structure 
Our micro simulation model ErbSiHM employs two databases. The main database is the 
inheritance tax statistics 2007 of the Federal Statistical Office Germany (subsequent ITS 
2007).
25 As ITS 2007 does not contain transfers of property in its entirety, we have completed 
ITS 2007 by means of the data of the socio-economic panel (SOEP) of the German Institute 
for Economic Research. ErbSiHM is a static micro simulation model and we have renounced 
static ageing. The static model structure results from lack of information about behavioural 
response to (changes in) inheritance tax.
26 We refrained from static ageing as an extrapolation 
according to numbers of property transfers does not alter calculated revenue-neutral tax rates 
in our virtual inheritance tax system and alternative extrapolation scenarios fail due to lack of 
information. 
                                                 
24   See Schneider/Enste (2000): 93 f. 
25   The ITS 2007 is the latest inheritance tax statistics and it can be used for scientific purposes since January 
2009. 
26  To develop a dynamic model requires information about behavioural response to inheritance tax. As far as 
we know there are neither reliable estimation results of tax elasticity nor do data exist that would allow such 
estimations. Furthermore behavioural response to inheritance tax is presumably relatively moderate as it 
requires both transfer of property and the removal of the decedent as well as the beneficiary (see 
Sachverständigenrat (2008/2009): 371).   11
5.2  Micro simulation model part based on inheritance tax statistics 2007 
The latest data of the inheritance tax statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office 
originate from 2007 and is our main data source. ITS 2007 contains micro data of every single 
transfer of property if an inheritance tax assessment in 2007 took place.
27 ITS 2007 provides 
several detailed information which enabled us to establish our micro simulation model. For 
example ITS 2007 offers information if a property is transferred via heritage or donation. In 
addition it reveals the composition of the property, the tax class, the amount of taxable 
enrichment and tax liability. This enables us to calculate for each transferee his taxable 
enrichment and his tax liability according to the former inheritance tax law and a virtual 
inheritance tax without subsidies. In addition detailed information about asset categories 
allow for identification of transferred businesses and for analysing their tax situation. 
ITS 2007 is the most comprehensive data base to analyse German inheritance tax empirically. 
It comprises 214,232 transfers of property whereof 154,402 transfers result from heritage and 
59,830 from donations. Within the 214,232 transfers of property 27,942 (13.5%) regard 
transfers of a business. Most of the aggregate tax base (68%) is taxed according to tax class I, 
though only 31% of all transfers take place within this tax class. ITS 2007 displays tax 
revenue of 4.2 Billion Euro which serves as a reference parameter for the simulation of a 
virtual revenue neutral inheritance tax with a broad tax base and low tax rates. Tax revenues 
result from an aggregate tax base (incl. former donations) of 28 Billion Euro. The underlying 
transfer of net property in tax values accounts for 35 Billion Euro. 
As ITS 2007 provides only tax values
28 market values have to be imputed. The imputation of 
market values is inevitable for the simulation of a virtual inheritance tax without tax subsidies 
as well as for the SOEP-based component of ErbSiHM. For the imputation we employed 
market value-multipliers which were gained empirically in other contributions. Market value-
multipliers for businesses were identified by Sureth and J. Müller based on DataStream.
29 The 
empirically obtained ratio of market value to tax value (market value-multiplier) for sole 
proprietorships and partnerships is 1.8572
30 and for shares of non-listed corporations 1.4493. 
The empirical market value-multiplier for real estate is based on purchase price data for 
Berlin and the underlying ratio of tax value to market value was established by 
Broekelschen/Maiterth (2008): 530. The multiplier of 1.4286 is roughly confirmed in 
subsequent analyses on basis of purchase price data for Lower Saxonia. For the imputation of 
market values of agriculture and forestry businesses we adopted a multiplier of 4.
31 As the in 
terms of German Inheritance Tax Act so called “residual property” consists of e.g. bank 
                                                 
27   If it is foreseeable that no tax assessment will happen then transfer of property is not included in ITS 2007. 
This applies to transfers of property with tax values below personal allowances.  
28   There is one exception which concerns “composite donations” as a subgroup of the donation population. For 
composite donations ITS 2007 also contains market values which are used as an auxiliary attribute in tax 
assessment procedure. As transferred debt is assessed by market value and some assets categories are not, 
debts can only be deducted according to the ratio of tax value to market value of transferred gross property. 
29   See in detail Maiterth/Sureth (2007): 39-42 and 51-57; Sureth et al. (2008): 192-195. 
30   The Sachverständigenrat (2008/2009) quotes a DIHK survey for 72 big family enterprises which states 
market values being 3 to 3.5 times higher than tax values (Sachverständigenrat (2008/2009): racital 362). 
Anyway, the empirical findings of Sureth et. al. (2008) do not confirm this figures. 
31  By imputing market values into the ITS 2007 the transfer of net property in market values accounts 48 
Billion €. This is an increase compared to figures in tax value of around 37%.   12
account, cash and stocks, tax and market values are identical and an imputation is not 
necessary. 
5.3  SOEP-based supplementary model 
The interaction of personal tax allowances and undervaluation of businesses and real estate 
according to the former German Valuation Tax Act results in a considerable under-recording 
of transfers of property in ITS 2007. To cover this data gap we have employed the SOEP. In a 
first step we imputed tax classes into SOEP on basis of the figures of ITS 2007. Then we 
classified both ITS 2007 data and SOEP data according to transferred net property in market 
values broken down by tax classes and by heritage versus donation. Subsequently we 
compared classified data of ITS 2007 and SOEP with respect to population density. The 
results show – as we have expected – an under-recording of transfers of low-value property in 
ITS 2007.
32 In cases of heritage transfers of property up to 550,000 Euro are under-recorded 
in ITS 2007. In cases of donation this holds for transfers of property up to 350,000 Euro. We 
solved the problem of under-recording in ITS 2007 by adding transfers of property which are 
not recorded in ITS 2007 to this data base (SOEP-based supplementary model). We created 
new datasets within the low-value property population of ITS 2007 by multiplying each 
dataset of ITS 2007 in a particular property class until the same amount of transfers occurred 
as in the corresponding SOEP-population (SOEP-based supplementary population). Thus the 
ITS 2007-population was boosted by approximately 674 thousand transfers of property with 
an aggregate net property value of 23 Billion Euro. 
5.4  Reliability of ErbSiHM 
We proved the quality of ErbSiHM, and with it the reliability of our results, by checking 
aggregate values calculated by ErbSiHM against displayed values in (original) ITS 2007. 
Table 3 depicts aggregate tax base and aggregate tax liability displayed and calculated for the 
entire ITS 2007 population. The comparison of calculated with displayed values proves the 
reliability of the employed attributes of ITS 2007. In addition it shows how precise the tax 
assessment procedure is reproduced by ErbSiHM. A further quality check was made for the 
imputation of market values into ITS 2007. For this purpose we compared imputed market 
values with displayed market values for the subpopulation of composite donations.
33 
Table 3:  Displayed and calculated aggregate values on bases of the (original) ITS 2007 
population 
   Aggregate tax base 
in million Euro 
Aggregate tax liability 
in million Euro 




Displayed in ITS 2007  28.182  4.221  2.993 
Calculated by ErbSiHM  28.052  4.212  2.965 
Difference  0.4613 %  - 0.2132 %  - 0.95% 
 
                                                 
32   In addition we found an under-recording of transfers of high-value property in SOEP. 
33  For this subpopulation ITS 2007 comprises market values as stated in footnote 28.   13
Table 3 shows only marginal differences between calculated and displayed values. This 
provides proof of the reliability of the employed micro simulation model ErbSiHM as well as 
of the quality of the applied imputation procedure. Hence, the subsequently represented 
results can be rated as reliable. 
6  Empirical Results 
6.1  Tax rates in case of an inheritance tax without tax base subsidies 
In the following our focus is not only on analysing potential liquidity problems caused by the 
former German inheritance tax. We also investigate possible damage of a revenue neutral 
inheritance tax law without subsidies, neither with respect to tax base nor to tax rates. For this 
purpose we have considered a virtual (uniform) inheritance tax law, based on current law, 
with the exception of tax subsidies for businesses and real estate. 
As there are several alternatives to gain tax neutrality in such a tax system, we have calculated 
tax rates that assure revenue neutrality according to every particular tax class. Table 4 shows 
to what extent tax rates in every tax class could be reduced by abolishing the tax subsidies of 
the current inheritance tax law. 
Table 4: Tax rate cuts and top tax rates in case of revenue neutrality per tax class  
  Tax class I  Tax class II  Tax class III 
Reduction of tax rates  59%  23%  19% 
Range of  tax rates  2.8%-12.3%  23.1%-38.5%  24.3%-40.5% 
 
Table 4 reveals that a uniform inheritance tax would be attended by substantial tax rate cuts in 
tax class I, whereas considerable high top tax rates would be remaining in tax class II and III. 
The tax rate cuts indicate an enormous shift of the tax load in particular from businesses to the 
remaining asset categories in current law. 
6.2  Contribution of businesses to tax revenue 
This chapter provides a survey of the relevance of transferred businesses for former and 
current inheritance tax revenue as well as for tax revenue in case of the virtual inheritance tax 
without tax subsidies as presented above.
 Table 5 highlights the contribution of businesses to 
former, current and virtual inheritance tax revenue.
34 The figures in table 5 and in subsequent 
tables are calculated by ErbSiHM based solely on the ITS 2007 population. As the SOEP data 
lack information on asset categories, a detailed analysis in respect of asset categories based on 
the SOEP-based supplementary population can not be conducted. 
                                                 
34   Due to lack of information on the use of the tax exemptions for businesses assumptions have to be made. We 
have implied that 30% of all businesses will claim against the entire tax exemption according to Sec. 13a 
Para. 8 ErbStG. Tax revenues in later periods resulting from the job-clause and the sales-clause were not 
taken into account. 
.   14
Table 5: Contribution of businesses to transferred net property and tax revenue 
 
Contribution to 
Transferred net property   Tax Revenue 
Former tax 
values  Market values  Former 
law  Current law  Virtual 
law 
Business assets  22.16%  31.87%  21.45%  5.35%  34.89% 
Real estate  31.25%  33.72%  24.61%  35.48%  25.98% 
Residual property  46.59%  34.41%  53.94%  59.17%  39.13% 
Total 100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%
 
Table 5 provides an impression of the magnitude of the tax subsidy for businesses in former 
and in current German inheritance tax law. Although businesses account for almost one third 
of all assets (in market values) their share to tax revenue is less than 6%. In contrast 
businesses contributed after all more than 20% to former inheritance tax revenue. In virtual 
inheritance tax law businesses have a share in tax revenue of nearly 35% which exceeds the 
share in transferred net property. This in turn indicates transfers of businesses take on average 
part in higher property brackets than the remaining asset categories. 
For a first sketchy assessment of the possible harm, the inheritance tax might cause to 
businesses, table 6 depicts several figures for the subpopulation “business transfers” 
differentiated according to heritages and donations. The subpopulation “business transfers” 
contains only property transfers which includes businesses. 























60.29% 31.14%  47.35%  56.06%  74.65%  49.95% 
Transfer by 
donation 
39.71% 68.86%  52.65%  43.94%  25.35%  50.05% 
Total 100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
 
Table 6 delivers some interesting insights into transfers of businesses. For example table 6 
reveals that about 40% of all businesses and with them more then two-thirds of all business 
assets are transferred via donation. This displays that the predominate volume of business 
assets is passed prearranged via donations. But, total assets are not as unequally distributed in 
favour of donations as business assets. This implies transfers of a business by heritage are on 
average to a larger extent accompanied by other assets than businesses. Although aggregate 
total assets are lower in case of bequeathed businesses than in case of bestowed businesses the 
contribution to tax revenue is higher in any tax law. This arises from the fact that transfers of 
property and businesses in tax class II and III are more frequent in case of inheritance then in 
case of donation.   15
In addition the results of table 6 allow for a first cautious appraisal of possible negative effects 
of the former German inheritance tax on transferred businesses. As donations take in all 
likelihood only place if either the transferred business is not assessed to be endangered by the 
former German inheritance tax law or a subsequent sale of the business is intended, we regard 
them as not endangered by the inheritance tax. Consequently, in respect of the former German 
inheritance tax we turn our attention in particular to transfers of businesses via heritage as 
they occur unplanned, and hence, appear especially vulnerable to liquidity problems. 
Nevertheless, we also account for donations to get a complete picture. With regard to a virtual 
inheritance tax with no tax privileges for businesses as a possible alternative to current 
German inheritance tax the impact of taxation on both forms of business transfers is of 
coequal interest. 
6.3   Inheritance tax burden of businesses 
After having demonstrated that businesses are subsidised to a large extent, the question occurs 
if this appears to be necessary for their survival or if, as a result of successful lobbying, this 
solely serves particulate interests. Consequently the results presented in this section are 
entirely based on the subpopulation “business transfers”. 
To get a first impression of the (possible) impact of the inheritance tax on liquidity of 
businesses, we have computed the ratio of inheritance tax liability to total net property (tax 
amount quota). By calculating the average tax amount quota for all heritages and donations, 
which include transfers of a business, we have differentiated between an unweighted and a 
weighted quota. The unweighted quota represents the average of the individual tax amount 
quota of every single beneficiary. What we call “weighted tax amount quota” equals what is 
usually called average aggregate tax burden and is calculated by dividing aggregate 
inheritance tax revenue by aggregate transferred property.
35 Table 7 depicts the tax amount 
quota. 
Table 7: Tax amount quota of all businesses 
 
Tax amount quota 
Former tax law  Virtual tax law 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Transfer  by  heritage  6.67% 8.84% 8.06% 8.83% 
Transfer  by  donation  1.82% 6.23% 4.18% 8.04% 
Total  4.74% 7.47% 6.52% 8.46% 
 
Table 7 comprises several interesting results. We start with the higher unweighted and 
weighted tax amount quotas of properties which are transferred via heritage than via donation. 
The differences in tax amount quota do not indicate that properties in case of succession are 
on average more valuable than in case of donation, as the opposite is true. The higher tax 
amount quotas emerge from significantly more businesses being transferred in tax class II and 
III in case of heritage then in case of donation. The sustainable disparity of unweighted and 
                                                 
35  By weighting individual tax amount quotas by the value of the transferred property the resulting average is 
equivalent to the weighted tax amount quota.   16
weighted tax amount quotas in case of donations is evidence of a rather unequal distribution 
of bestowed property. In contrast, the distribution of bequeathed property which includes 
businesses is less unequal.  
Furthermore table 7 depicts generally higher tax amount quotas in virtual tax law, although 
even higher quotas could have been expected as the contribution of businesses to tax revenue 
is significantly higher in virtual tax law compared to former tax law as seen in table 5 
(34.89% versus 21.45%). But, as we will later see in detail, transfers of a business are very 
often accompanied by other assets which in turn face in virtual tax law almost lower tax 
burdens than in former tax law. The tax burden on residual property is reduced by 19% (tax 
class III) to 59% (tax class I) and also real estate is considerably less burdened in tax class I. 
As most of all property transfers which include businesses take place in tax class I (57.19% of 
all cases and 88.07% of the volume) these tax reductions balance the tax increase for 
businesses to some extent or even entirely in case of the weighted quota of bequeathed 
businesses. 
Table 7 allows for a first precautious conclusion even at this early state of our empirical 
analysis. As the tax amount quotas are in either case far below 10% neither the former 
German inheritance tax nor a virtual inheritance tax without tax subsidies for businesses are 
likely to endanger businesses to a large extent. But as the marginal tax rate for businesses is 
30% in former tax law and even 40.5% in virtual tax law tax induced damage still remains 
possible. 
For the identification of negative effects of the inheritance tax on the liquidity positions of 
businesses it is inadequate tax amount quotas to consider only, as it remains unclear if the 
entire tax liability burdens businesses effectively.
36 Hence we calculate to what extent the 
inheritance tax liability can be covered by other assets which are transferred in addition to 
businesses. This means, merely the fraction of tax liability which exceeds transferred real 
estate and residual property is taken into account.
37 As we are interested in the tax load that 
has to be covered by business assets we have divided the tax load by the market value of 
business assets to gain what we call tax load quota. In other words, the tax load quota 
incorporates only the part of tax liability which burdens transferred businesses effectively. 
Table 8 resembles table 7 and depicts the tax load quota. 
Table 8: Tax load quota of all businesses 
 
Tax load quota 
Former tax law  Virtual tax law 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Transfer  by  heritage  0.07% 2.21% 0.40% 4.16% 
Transfer  by  donation  1.12% 5.93% 2.99% 7.78% 
Total  0.49% 4.77% 1.43% 6.66% 
 
                                                 
36  Frequently is stated that the bulk of an entrepreneur’s estate consists of business assets and relatively little 
liquid assets (see e.g. Brunetti (2006): 1976). 
37  Holtz-Eakin/Phillips/Rosen (2001) analyse whether and how owner of family business attempt to close the 
gap between estate tax liability and liquid assets by the purchase of life insurances.   17
Table 8 shows substantially lower tax load quotas compared to tax amount quotas by 
exemption of the weighted quota of bestowed businesses. This indicates that transferees of a 
business receive very often other assets in addition to the business which enable them to 
balance large parts or even the entire inheritance tax liability. In contrast to table 7 weighted 
values exceed unweighted values significantly in either case. This indicates a highly unequal 
distribution of tax burdened businesses. 
Although the surprisingly low tax amount and tax load quotas displayed in table 7 and 8 
suggest no general threat of businesses, it can not be ruled out that the inheritance tax 
endangers part of the businesses. In particular there are hints that the inheritance tax could in 
particular endanger valuable businesses and with them many jobs. To tackle this issue table 9 
differentiates between businesses which do not face any tax load and thus which do. Table 9 
is classified according to the value of the transferred net property. 
Table 9:  Number of tax loaded and non tax loaded businesses in former and virtual 
German inheritance tax 
Value of net property in 
Euro  Transfer by heritage  Transfer by donation 













0 20,000  2,051 5 11 705 132  3
20,001 100,000  4,984 28 118 1,699 281  398
100,001 500,000  5,817 49 210 4,191 554  947
500,001 1,000,000  2,058  49 115 2,513 726  1,786
1,000,001 10,000,000  1,838  154 217 1,876 1,432  1,547
Beyond 97  38 45 113 110  102
 
Table 9 reveals some very amazing results in particular in respect of bequeathed businesses. It 
is demonstrated that less than 2% (323 businesses) of all (16,845) bequeathed businesses are 
effectively burdened with former German inheritance tax law. This means that more than 98% 
of bequeathed businesses face no tax load at all. Even in the class of net properties over 10 
million Euro more than 60% of businesses are not burdened with former German inheritance 
tax. But although only about 2% of bequeathed businesses are burdened by former inheritance 
tax more than one third (36%) of aggregate business assets are concerned. Donated businesses 
face in less than 30% (3,235 businesses) of all businesses (11,097) a tax load in former 
German inheritance tax, but high value businesses (value more than 1,000,000 Euro) are 
burdened with tax in most cases. Hence, 76% of aggregate business assets belong to tax 
burdened businesses. As the figures in table 9 demonstrate in virtual inheritance tax law 
businesses face more often tax loads than in former tax law. This holds for both forms of 
transferring a business, heritage and donation. 
Table 10 depicts the share of business assets in total assets and delivers an explanation why 
many businesses do not face a tax load although they are subject to tax. It also illustrates the 
reason for bestowed businesses facing a higher tax load than bequeathed businesses. Like 
table 9 table 10 is classified according to the value of the transferred net property.   18
Table 10: Share of business assets in total assets according to net property classes 
Value of net property in Euro  Transfer by heritage  Transfer by donation  From To 
0 20,000 10.97%  79.71% 
20,001 100,000 16.20%  73.26% 
100,001 500,000 21.02%  80.14% 
500,001 1,000,000 31.18%  91.11% 
1,000,001 10,000,000 46.80%  94.68% 
Beyond 76.52%  99.34% 
Total 47.18%  93.85% 
 
Table 10 reveals a rather different structure of the composition of total assets between 
transfers via heritage and donation. Businesses are throughout the predominant source of 
assets in case of donation. If transferred net property exceeds 500,000 Euro businesses even 
amount to more than 90% of total assets. Hence the inheritance tax liability has to be balanced 
widely by business assets or other sources of the transferee. Transfers of businesses via 
heritage are accompanied to a far larger extent by other assets than donations. Even properties 
worth more than 10 million Euros include (on average) almost 25% of other assets, which can 
be used to meet or mitigate inheritance tax liability. Table 10 delivers a quite good 
explanation for the, on average, rather low tax load quota, as businesses are, on average, by 
far not the only transferred asset category. 
Up to now it can be asserted that neither the former German inheritance tax nor the virtual 
inheritance tax is a threat for the vast majority of businesses. But as the businesses which are 
hit by the inheritance tax possess a large share in total business assets it can not be ruled out 
that the inheritance tax causes severe damage to affected businesses. Hence, in the subsequent 
analysis we quantify the magnitude of tax loads. Consequently the subsequent remarks 
concentrate on the subpopulation of tax loaded businesses. 
Table 11 displays tax load quotas of tax burdened businesses. 
Table 11: Tax load quota of tax burdened businesses 
 
Tax load quota 
Former tax law  Virtual tax law 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Transfer  by  heritage  3.80% 6.18% 9.50% 9.73% 
Transfer  by  donation  3.83% 7.82% 6.93% 9.30% 
Total  3.83% 7.53% 7.27% 9.38% 
 
Compared to the figures for all businesses presented in table 8 both tax load quotas, 
unweighted and weighted, are considerably higher. But, on average the tax load of businesses 
in former tax law is in either case below 8% and in virtual tax law below 10%. As we 
consider a tax load quota of up to 10% not as a serious threat for businesses, it can be stated 
that even tax burdened businesses are in general not endangered by German inheritance tax.   19
But for an appraisal of the potential harm of the inheritance tax the scale of tax loads for 
individual businesses is relevant. As the impact of the inheritance tax on liquidity is decisive 
for the survival of every single firm the subsequent tables only contain unweighted tax quotas. 
Table 12a and 12b display the tax load quota in former German tax law according to the 
market value of businesses in a Box-Whisker-Plot extending to the 5
th and 95
th percentiles. 
We employ market value of business assets instead of net property for classification purposes 
in the following tables as we are focusing the tax load of businesses.
38 
Table 12a: Tax load quota of bequeathed businesses in former German tax law 
 
Table 12a reveals a tax load quota of below 5% for the vast majority of businesses (71%) 
which possess 40% of all business assets. Even 75% of all businesses which are passed in a 
business assets range between one to ten million Euros (class 4) face a tax load not more than 
6%. For 50% of businesses with a business assets value above 10 million Euros tax load quota 
is below 7%. For the remaining businesses within this business assets class the tax load quota 
in 95% falls below 10%. Tax load quotas above 15% hit only 3 businesses. 
                                                 
38  The classification in tables 12a to 13b refers to figueres between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the business 
assets value class up to 100,000 Euro, 2 the business assets value class up 500,000 Euro, 3 the business assets 
value class up 1,000,000 Euro, 4 the business assets value class up 10,000,000 Euro and 5 the business assets 
value class beyond 10,000,000 Euro.   20
Table 12b: Tax load quota of bestowed businesses in former German tax law 
 
The figures for bestowed businesses do not highly differ from the results presented above. 
The most significant differences are a higher tax load of low value businesses (business assets 
value below 100,000 Euro (class 1))
39 and more businesses with a tax load quota over 10%. 
But there are only 31 (0.96%) businesses which possess 6.56% of all business assets facing a 
tax load quota over 15%. 
Summing up, the results for the former German inheritance tax lead to the conclusion that 
former German inheritance tax does not endanger bequeathed businesses. Only few 
businesses face tax load quotas above 10% and therefore may have problems of financing 
(parts of) the inheritance tax. For bestowed businesses the results reveal that plans of donating 
a business do not failure due to former German inheritance tax. 
The conclusions for the virtual inheritance tax are by far less clear-cut as table 13a and 13b 
depict. 
                                                 
39  The explanation for this finding is that more businesses in this business asset value class are passed to 
transferees in tax class II and III than in case of heritage.   21
Table 13a: Tax load quota of bequeathed businesses in virtual German tax law 
 
Table 13a reveals a distinctly higher tax load of bequeathed businesses in many cases than in 
former tax law. In particular businesses with a value up to 1,000,000 Euro (classes 1 to 3) face 
substantially higher tax load quotas. In addition tax load quotas over 10% happen in 39.4% of 
all cases and affect 46.3% of total business assets. Even tax load quotas over 15% are no 
curiosity as 27.79% of all businesses which possess 11.06% of total business assets are 
concerned. Even peak values over 30% affect 5 businesses. These rather high tax load quotas 
result in particular from the high tax rates in tax class II and III. 
Table 13b: Tax load quota of bestowed businesses in virtual German tax law 
 
The results for bestowed businesses are similar as for bequeathed businesses in net business 
assets class 2 and 3 as businesses worth up to 500,000 Euro are often passed to transferees in   22
tax class II or III. The remaining businesses face, if that, only moderately higher tax load 
quotas in virtual tax law. This results in 21.6% of all businesses which possess 37.2% of total 
business assets facing a tax load quota above 10%. Furthermore 17.2% of all businesses with 
8.4% of total assets are burdened above 15%. A tax load quota over 30% affects 9 businesses 
which incorporate 4.2% of total business assets. 
Unfortunately the conclusions for the virtual inheritance tax are not as straightforward as for 
the former German inheritance tax. In contrast to the latter tax load quotas over 10% are not 
an exception in the virtual inheritance tax. Even higher tax load quotas are no curiosity. 
Relating tax load quotas over 10% to all transferred businesses relaxes the findings slightly as 
only 4.7% of all businesses face tax load quotas of this amount. But, as these businesses 
incorporate 27.6% of total business assets it can not been ruled out entirely that the virtual 
inheritance tax might cause some serious damage. As in particular the very high tax rates in 
tax class II and III are accountable for this outcome, alternative inheritance tax reform 
scenarios with lower tax rates could be taken into account. 
6.4  Conclusion 
The presented empirical results suggest that the enormous tax subsidies for businesses 
established by the German Inheritance Tax Reform Act 2009 are the result of successful 
lobbying, but can not be justified by the protection of businesses. The former German 
inheritance tax which also provided tax privileges for businesses, but to a far lower extent, 
burdens bequeathed businesses, if at all, only moderately. As bequeathed businesses are 
accompanied to a large extent by other assets most or even all of the inheritance tax liability 
does not burden business assets. Businesses which were transferred via donation in former 
inheritance tax law do not seem to be damaged by the tax. Otherwise entrepreneurs would 
have postponed the transfer of their businesses. As the bestowed businesses face moderate tax 
burdens the former German inheritance tax appear not as an obstacle for the donation of 
businesses. 
The conclusion for a virtual inheritance tax with a broad tax base and lower tax rates, as 
considered in this contribution as an alternative to the current inheritance tax, is not so clear-
cut. The considered virtual tax provides relatively high tax rates in tax class II and III as a 
result of assumed tax neutrality per tax class. Although far the most of all transferred 
businesses are not burdened by this virtual inheritance tax a small fraction faces relatively 
high tax burdens. As these businesses incorporate about one quarter of total business assets, 
inheritance tax induced damage can not be ruled out entirely. 
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